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Overview 
This paper considers how the economic theory underpinning E-commerce 
technology platforms such as Uber, Market Design (and specifically a two-
sided matching markets), may be utilised to de-risk multi-owned housing 
development, and thus contribute to improved housing affordability. 
Semi-structured interviews with operators of real estate platforms 
aggregating demand and with ‘deliberative developers’ (DIY development 
syndicates) 
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Uber, Tinder, Grindr, Airbnb…. Digital disruption 
A technological & social revolution 
•  Internet 
•  Mobile telephony 
•  Real time, ‘networked’ & cheap communications 
•  Computing power & applications 
Also an economic revolution 
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Market Design (Alvin Roth) 
 Economic theory behind E-commerce eg Uber, AirBNB, but also human kidney 
donation, native vegetation offsets etc 
 
An off-shoot of game theory (strategic behaviour & cooperation) 
 
Market Design fixes markets or creates ‘markets where there were none’ (Roth 
2007, p. 1). 
 
Whereas neo-classical  economics posits markets as ‘simply the confluence of 
supply and demand’ (Roth, 2007, p. 1),  Market Design understands markets as 
‘constructions’ that have been designed and which have rules that evolve over 
time in response to the economic environment. This presupposes that there is 
no single market design or construction.  
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Market Design 
‘Two-sided matching markets’ 
 One of the main functions of many markets and social 
 processes is to match one kind of agent with another: e.g. 
 students and colleges, workers and firms, marriageable men 
 and women…A market is two-sided if there are two sets of 
 agents, and if an agent from one side of the market can be 
 matched only with an agent from the other side. (Erev et al., 
 2002) 
 
•  Aggregation of buyers and sellers into two ‘pools’ (via membership)  
•  Market manager (platform/clearinghouse) 
Enables 
•  Pre-identification of potential buyers & data on actual preferences 
(thus reducing search costs) 
•  Supply side responsiveness to demand (segmentation) 
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Market Design 
The four prerequisites of a properly functioning two-sided market: 
 
•  Thickness 
•  Requisite number of buyers & sellers 
•  Safe 
•  Confidence to reveal their information 
•  Simplicity 
•  Rules & processes need to be workable, transparent & remove need for 
complex strategising 
•  Congestion 
•  Transactions need to be conducted quickly and efficiently 
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Critical understanding of how private apartments are 
provided is very limited (generally, not just Australia) 
•  “empirical evidence related to house-building is 
limited” (Ball 2012: 29) 
•  Practice & teaching literature 
•  Small critical literature on developers and the 
development industry 
Residential development finance credit assessment: lost 
sight of key risk 
Knowledge gaps 
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Market Design 
Renewed attention to critical issues facing markets, which Milgrom (2011, p. 
311-319) outlines as: 
 
•  product definition – what is the commodity and how should it be defined?;  
 
•  messages – how do participants communicate in markets?;   
 
•  incentives – the trade-offs between the incentives provided for truthful 
reporting 
 
•  linkages among markets – how trade in different goods are linked.   
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Why apply Market Design to multi-owned housing? 
 
The apartment development model in Australia  needs fixing! 
It involves: 
•  High search costs for presales  
•  Settlement risk 
 
 
That is, demand volatility is the major risk of development & mitigation 
measures are inadequate. 
 
Outcomes: 
•  Generic, poor quality product 
•  Lack of owner-occupation 
•  Reliance on uplift in values (Speculation) 
Looking for 
needles in a 
haystack 
Swinburne 
SCIENCE  |  TECHNOLOGY  |  INNOVATION  |  BUSINESS  |  DESIGN 
 Can an Uber for multi-owned housing solve some common housing problems? 
10 
Applying Market Design to multi-unit housing 
Search problem? 
•  Aggregate buyers, find out what they want, line them up 
•  Aggregate developers, branding & reputation 
•  Relationships & communications 
Settlement risk? 
•  Create attachment by responding to articulated preferences 
 
 
Shooting fish in 
a barrel 
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Emerging two-sided market platforms 
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Interviews with  
2 internet platforms  
 Melbourne-based, Apartment Register  
 German-based, going international, Group Estate 
 
2 deliberative developers (DIY developers who aggregate 
demand) 
  Melbourne-based Nightingale Housing & Property 
 Collectives 
1 Case study of internet platform (Citiniche) compiled from 
publically available data  
 
NOT crowdfunding websites or fractional real estate 
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 Findings 
Market is broken – needs fixing 
Responding to lack of product for owner occupiers and concerned 
about declining affordability 
Implicit and explicit knowledge of two-sided matching markets 
  ‘housing dating bureau’ 
Costs of obtaining presales can be reduced by aggregation 
 ‘Every baugruppen that exists has an organiser who’s already paying money to 
somebody to try and find members. Usually, they’re doing it a very inefficient way’. 
Trust incredibly important –information & truthfulness fundamental to 
success -  marketplace must be safe 
Buyer stickiness (responsiveness to preferences) mitigates settlement 
risk 
Noted the substantial linkages with other markets (eg credit) – 
aggregation permitted more advantageous finance deals 
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Findings 
Thickness  - benefits available even when small number of 
buyers and sellers but more concerned that buyers can 
exercise choice  
Congestion – ‘a problem we’d love to have’ but awareness 
that satisfying demand means a pipeline of projects is 
needed – but development can be delayed for many 
reasons – concern buyers will seek alternative housing 
options 
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Conclusions  
•  Market design is explicitly and implicitly informing innovation in delivery 
of multi-owned housing 
 
•  Aggregating demand and greater responsiveness to demand 
preferences recognised as a key means of reducing development risk. 
•  Two-sided matching markets are able to reduce production costs, 
improve quality and affordability. 
Can an Uber for multi-owned 
housing solve some common 
housing problems? 
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